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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic seigniorage model where excessive debt levels persist in
steady state, causing a permanent inflation bias. Discretionary monetary responses to
shocks are too interventionist because they do not take into account the role of debt policy,
which spreads part of the adjustment onto future periods. Institutional design should
contemplate the appointment of weight-conservative central bankers. The central bank
preferences should be more conservative the more the government is willing to delay the
adjustment of expenditures following a supply shock. The combination of fiscal
intervention and a zero inflation rule describes how members of a monetary union might
react to asymmetric shocks. The costs of this regime are negligible if the discount factor is
small and seigniorage losses are limited.
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1. Introduction
It is often argued that inflation has a fiscal root. Empirical research identifies optimal tax
considerations as a determinant of inflation differences across countries (Campillo and Miron, 1996).
Furthermore, an important strand of literature sees distortionary taxes as the source of time-
inconsistency in the conduct of monetary policy (Alesina and Tabellini, 1987). Therefore it seems a
little surprising that the recent debate on monetary institutions, i.e. the controversy between
performance-based contracts à la Walsh and weight conservatism à la Rogoff, has neglected the
consequences of debt policy for institutional design (Walsh, 1995; Svensson, 1997; Muscatelli,
1998). This is probably due to the fact that dynamic seigniorage models provide a framework for the
analysis of time-inconsistency in monetary policy games that is not entirely satisfactory. Consider for
instance the work of Jensen (1994), who investigates the link between debt accumulation and
monetary policy. Jensen’s model suggests that inflation is a temporary phenomenon because in the
long run re-invested budget surpluses will earn the income necessary to completely finance the public
expenditure target, removing the need for distortionary sources of revenue
1. Unfortunately empirical
evidence suggests that governments are apparently unwilling to accumulate such large surpluses. The
persistence of excessive debt levels may be explained with the politico-economic equilibria that arise
from the intergenerational conflict analysed in Cuckierman and Meltzer (1989), where the
accumulation of public debt allows bequest-constrained individuals to raise their consumption levels
at the expenses of future generations.
This paper presents a dynamic seigniorage model that accounts for the policymaker’s aversion to a
policy of debt reduction. By doing so we obtain a more realistic description of debt and inflation in
the long run, showing that positive debt and inflation levels persist in steady state if the policymaker
is sufficiently averse to debt reduction. Within this framework we are able to analyse both the
consequences of political shifts – i.e. changes in the relative preference for public expenditures – and
                                                       
1 Obstfeld (1991) and Van der Ploeg (1995) obtain a similar result using different models.3
the performance of monetary regimes, presenting an alternative view on the desirability of
countercyclical monetary policies when fiscal policy is also used for stabilisation purposes.
We find that political shifts unambiguously affect steady state equilibria. For instance, debt increases
if the median voter becomes relatively less concerned with the benefits of public expenditures. This
result is explained as follows. When choosing the optimal debt policy, the policymaker takes into
account both the political cost of reducing debt and the long-term increase in expenditures which
originates from a permanent reduction in debt service. If the perceived benefits from expenditures
fall, the incentive to reduce debt will obviously be weaker. Thus we provide an interpretation of the
surge in debt levels following the election of right-wing governments which is alternative to strategic
debt models (Persson and Svensson, 1989).
Turning to the analysis of monetary policy, we find that the inflation bias is inversely related to
current debt levels, and time-dependent - due to the sluggish convergence of debt to steady state.
Another result concerns the effects of discretionary stabilisation policies, when both the fiscal
authority and the central bank react to supply shocks
2. In this case uncoordinated monetary policy
overreacts to disturbances because it does not internalise the role of debt, which spreads part of the
adjustment over future expenditures. In fact the strength of the optimal monetary response to shocks
is positively related to the policymaker’s discount factor. The more the policymaker is willing to use
debt as a shock absorber, the less monetary intervention is needed.
These results bear important implications for the design of monetary institutions. First of all, we
analyse delegation schemes. We find that inflation targets are ill-suited to correct the time-varying
component of the inflation bias. Furthermore, targets cannot limit the excess sensitivity of monetary
policy to shocks. To improve welfare, institutional design should contemplate the assignment of
targets to weight-conservative Central Banks. Second, we analyse the performance of a simple zero-
                                                       
2 Countercyclical policies are often conceived as the exclusive domain of monetary policy, which provides a more
flexible instrument. In fact what matters is whether fiscal policy is sufficiently flexible to respond to shocks. Empirical
evidence suggests that OECD governments have made substantial use of their debt policies (Sorensen and Yoshua
1998).4
inflation rule when the economy is subject to supply shocks. The combination of fiscal intervention
and zero-inflation rule presents a stylised account of how members of a monetary union might react
to asymmetric shocks. We find that even such extreme form of conservatism is preferred to
discretionary monetary stabilisation policy if a small amount of domestic money holdings limits the
loss of seigniorage revenues and if the fiscal authority relies heavily on debt as a shock-absorber.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we present the model and derive the steady state
solution for debt levels and expenditures. In section 3 we identify the precommitment monetary
policy rule and define the inflation bias. In section 4 we evaluate the performance of alternative
institutional arrangements. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
To begin with, we define the aggregate supply function
( ) t t t
e
t y t e p p - + - = (1)
where output deviations from the socially optimal level,  t y , depend on distortionary taxes
3,  t t , a
shock  t e , independently distributed with zero mean and finite variance
2
e s , and inflation surprises
( )t
e p p -  where 
e
t p defines the rational expectation of inflation.
In each period public expenditures, Gt, are financed by means of public debt, distortionary taxes and
seigniorage revenues. Hence the government budget constraint is
( )t 1 t t k ˆ G D ) r 1 ( D p t - - + + = - (2)
where Dt denotes the stock of government debt at the end of period t, r is the real rate of interest
4.
and k ˆ defines the effect of inflation on seigniorage revenues, as in Beetsma et al. (1997).
                                                       
3 Following Alesina and Tabellini (1987) we define t as a tax rate on the total revenue of firms.
4 To limit analytical complexities we assume that r is constant and government debt is fully indexed, as in Jensen
(1994), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997).5
Jensen (1994) postulates an intertemporal version of the loss function presented in Alesina and
Tabellini (1987), where it is assumed that losses are quadratic in output, inflation and expenditure
deviations from a desired target, G
~ . He shows that in equilibrium inflation and tax distortions
disappear because the government is able to build up a stock of negative debt. In other words, re-
invested budget surpluses will earn the income necessary to finance expenditures, removing the need
for distortionary sources of revenue. Output distortions and inflation therefore persist only during the
transition, and are positively related to current debt levels. Convergence to a non-distortionary
steady state is ruled out only if the policymaker discounts the future so heavily that the process of
debt accumulation becomes unstable. The model offers useful insights on the relationship between
debt dynamics and inflation, but the steady state properties appear counterfactual. The zero-inflation
equilibrium implies that current generations altruistically bear the costs of running budget surpluses
in order to relieve future generations from the burden of distortionary taxation. This outcome might
hold in a purely neo-Ricardian world where generations are altruistically linked through bequests, so
that the intertemporal distribution of deficits only responds to efficiency considerations. However,
Cukierman an Meltzer (1989) show that if some individuals are bequest constrained – i.e. they would
like to borrow from future generations leaving negative bequests - fiscal policy may be biased
towards excessive debt accumulation. In fact the public debt policy allows bequest-constrained
individuals to raise their consumption levels at the expenses of future generations. This happens
because deficits are used to subsidise the consumption of bequest-constrained agents, whereas debt
will partly substitute capital in the portfolio of non bequest-constrained individuals. Extending the
analysis of Cuckierman and Meltzer to account for distortionary taxation and time–inconsistency in
monetary policy would quickly render their model intractable. To the contrary, the Jensen model may
be easily modified to capture the essence of the contribution of Cuckierman and Meltzer and to
obtain the persistence of public debt in equilibrium. Consider the following intertemporal loss
function:6
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where b is a discount factor. As in Jensen (1994), we assume that the per-period loss function is
quadratic in output, inflation and expenditure deviations from target,G
~ . In addition, the linear term
5
) D D ~ ( k s 3 -  implies that running a budget surplus in order to reduce the stock of debt carried over
to the next periods entails a political cost for the fiscal authority
6
To close the model we need further assumptions about policy regimes. In this section we discuss the
case of full discretion, where the policymaker and the central bank are characterised by identical
preferences, and neither is able to precommit. The Bellman equation is
7:
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where inflation, taxes and the stock of debt carried over to the next period are the policy
instruments. To solve the model we derive the first-order conditions.
( ) 0 ) D ( V k G ~ G k t D 3 t 1 = + - - b  (5)
The intertemporal condition (5), states that in each period Dt is set at the level where the marginal
costs
8 from a policy of debt reduction must equal the discounted value of marginal benefits
originating from the greater availability of resources for public spending in the future: 
                                                       
5 For sake of analytical tractability we do not consider quadratic deviations of debt from target.
6 One may think of  ~ D as the level of debt which would emerge if non-distortionary taxes were available in a world
where bequest-constrained individuals affect politico-economic equilibria.7
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Substituting (6) into (5) and forwarding we obtain the general form of the Euler equation which
defines the optimal relationship between expected and current expenditures for any future period:
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If  0 k3 > the ratio of current to future expenditures increases relative to the case discussed in Jensen
(1994).
Then we turn to the static conditions that determine the optimal mix of revenues in each period.
( ) ( ) 0 G ~ G k y t t 1 = - + -  (8)
( ) ( ) 0 k G
~
G k k ˆ y t t t 2 1 = + - + p (9)
Condition  (8) equates the marginal benefits of a tax-financed increase in expenditures with the
marginal costs of higher taxes. Condition (9) equates the perceived marginal costs and benefits of
inflation, where the latter include both seigniorage-financed increases in public expenditure and the
higher output generated by monetary surprises.
The next step is the definition of the wage setters’ forecast rule. In modelling the game between the
policy-maker and the private sector we confine our attention to Markov-perfect equilibria, where
game history affects current actions of the players only through the state variables. The only concern
                                                                                                                                                                                       
7 We closely follow here Jensen’s solution method (Jensen, 1994).
8 Raising expenditures is obviously beneficial as long as they are below target.8
to the private sector here is to prevent monetary surprises
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Using eq.(1), (8), (9) and (10) we obtain the open loop solutions for taxes and inflation:
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The tax rate rises with the public expenditures gap (eq. 11), and fully incorporates the output shifts
due to supply shocks and monetary surprises. As a result inflation responds only to the expenditure
gap (eq.12). However supply shocks do have an impact on inflation through their effect on current
expenditures. To obtain the optimal level of expenditures under discretion,
d
t G , we proceed as
follows. Having imposed the standard no-Ponzi-Game condition:






the intertemporal budget constraint takes the form
10:
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Substituting (7), (11), (12) into (14) yields:
                                                       
9 The focus on Markov-perfect equilibria is standard in monetary policy games (Van der Ploeg, 1995; Svensson, 1997)
For a more extensive characterisation see Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994). This assumption is obviously implicit
in Jensen (1994)
10 The term  G ~
r
r 1+
appears in (14) because we have chosen to express current and future expenditures as deviations
from the target.9
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where:
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Solving eq.(2) for G
d d d , , p t  yields:
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which is stable if
  1 ) r 1 ( > + b . (17)
In the rest of the paper we shall assume that (17) holds.
The sensitivity of expenditures to the current debt burden (eq.15) may be interpreted as follows. An
increase in  1 t D ) r 1 ( - +  must be matched by an increase in the present value of current and expected
primary surpluses, which is measured by  ( ) G ~ G



















proportion of adjustment which is implemented immediately. As long as (17) holds, the impact of
( ) 1 t D r 1 - + on Gt falls with the discount factor, because a greater share of the debt burden is shifted
onto the future. Moreover, the reduction in current expenditures necessary to balance the
intertemporal budget constraint is inversely related to the strength of the response, in each period, of10











k ˆ k ˆ 1 k 1  describes the sensitivity
of the primary balance to a change in Gt.
Debt policy is also used to cushion expenditures from supply shocks. Observe that expenditures are
more sensitive to debt changes than to supply shocks, i.e.
d d Q W < . This result is intuitively
explained as follows. An adverse supply shock requires a tax reduction that drains resources
otherwise available for public spending. However, the unexpected fall in expenditures triggers an
inflation surprise that stimulates output, raises seigniorage revenues and limits the tax reduction





k ˆ 1+ describes how the inflation surprise weakens the impact of adverse
supply shocks on expenditures. The relevance of this effect is inversely related to the size of the
discount factor. In fact when b is relatively low the response of current expenditures to shocks is
limited because the government shifts a relatively large part of the adjustment onto future periods.
In steady state we get:
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G ~ G (18b)
d D¥  rises with  3 k . If the latter term is sufficiently strong, positive debt levels persist in equilibrium.
Only if  0 k3 =  inflation and distortionary taxes disappear in equilibrium. Comparing (7) to (18a,b) it
is easy to see that the policymaker’s reluctance to reduce debt leads to higher current expenditures
but causes an inefficient equilibrium in steady state. We are also able to assess the implications of
political shifts on debt accumulation. For instance, if society assigns less importance to the welfare11
system and is relatively more concerned with the distortionary effects of higher taxes - i.e. both
G
~ and  1 k  fall - the policymaker will cut taxes and expenditures but accumulate debt. The latter effect
takes place because the policymaker will be less concerned with the long-term reduction of resources
available for public expenditures.
3. Monetary precommitment
To assess the welfare implications of a discretionary regime we obviously need to define a
precommitment rule as the benchmark case. Eq.(10) shows that any systematic attempt to offset
output distortions by means of monetary surprises simply raises inflation expectations. Thus, absent
supply shocks, the optimal policy rule should simply equate the marginal costs of higher inflation to
the marginal benefits in terms of greater expenditures
11. On the other hand, optimal tax
considerations intuitively suggest that both monetary and fiscal policies should adjust in response to
shocks. In fact eq.(15) shows that monetary policy flexibility allows to reduce the sensitivity of
expenditures to supply shocks. Therefore we assume that the central bank is able to precommit to
the following policy rule:
[ ] t t
2
1 c
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k ˆ implies that on average monetary policy will only provide the optimal
amount of seigniorage revenue necessary to finance the expenditures forecast
12, neglecting the effect
of tax distortions on output. The optimal monetary response to expenditure shocks, i. e. parameter
f , should strike a balance between the need to stabilise expenditures by adjusting seigniorage, and
                                                       
11  This point is also discussed in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997).
12  ( )t G ~ G E -  is the rational expectation of expenditures available at the time when inflation expectations are formed.12
the increase in inflation volatility that such policy would inevitably cause. To identify the optimal
(precommitment) inflation rate, the inflation bias and the optimal value of f  we proceed as follows.
From (11), (14) and (19) we get the solutions for the tax rate, expenditures and debt.
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The first r.h.s. term of (23) shows that the inflation bias is less than proportional to the differences in
the sensitivity of inflation to the output gap. In fact the larger amount of seigniorage revenues
available under discretion allows the policymaker to raise expenditures. This, in turn, mitigates the
inflation bias. The second r.h.s. term of (23) is already familiar: it defines the policymaker’s
willingness to adjust the current primary balance in response to the former accumulation of debt. The13
weaker it is, the smaller are both the expenditure gap and the inflation bias. Finally, the third r.h.s.
term of (23) shows that past accumulation of debt widens the expenditure gap and exacerbates the
inflation bias. Moreover, it is interesting to observe that the policymaker aversion to a reduction of
debt generates a smaller current inflation bias. This happens because the larger  3 k  the greater the
level of current expenditures. However the following discussion will show that this causes a larger
inflation bias in steady state.
Comparing (16) and (22) it is easy to see that the precommitment rule cannot affect the level of debt
in steady state: eq. (18a) still holds. On the other hand the precommitment rule lowers seigniorage
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As a consequence, the inflation bias in steady state is:
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Substituting (19), (20) and (21) into the welfare function and minimising its expected value with














The optimal monetary response to supply shocks is weaker than under discretion. The intuition
behind this result is as follows. We have already shown that under discretion the monetary response14
to unexpected shifts in expenditures triggers a fiscal reaction. This, in turn, reduces the sensitivity of
current taxes and expenditures to shocks. Under a balanced budget rule the latter effect would
always offset the welfare losses deriving from the greater volatility of inflation. Unfortunately, in this
case the policy rule (12) ignores the role of debt policy, which spreads part of the adjustment over
future expenditures and limits the need for monetary intervention. Therefore a discretionary
monetary policy is too “interventionist”. The problem gets more serious when the discount factor is
relatively low and the policymaker is relatively more willing to adjust the debt level rather than
current expenditures. This explains why f * falls as ( ) 1 r 1
2 ﬁ + b .
4. Implications for institutional design
Let us now turn to the analysis of policy design. Suppose the policymaker delegates monetary policy
to an independent central bank, held accountable by means of a performance-based contract which
includes an explicit inflation target
14. The central banker’s loss function may be written as:
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The policymaker and the central bank minimise (3) and (27) respectively
15. The open loop solutions
for debt policy and the tax rate, defined in eq. (7) and (11), still hold. By contrast eq. (12) becomes:
                                                                                                                                                                                       
13  See the Appendix for a proof.
14 It would be straightforward to show that the results presented in this section would hold even if the central bank
were not concerned with the level of public expenditures. Furthermore, our conclusions do not depend on the specific
features of the contract between the bank and her political principal, provided that such contract cannot be state
contingent.
15 We assume that the fiscal and monetary authorities act non-co-operatively, confining our analysis to Markov
equilibria, characterised by a combination of  t t t D , ,p t  such that i)  t t D , p minimise (4) taking  t p  as given; ii) t p
minimises (27) taking  t t D , p as given.15
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From eq. (25) it is intuitively obvious that setting
{ }
c d T E ¥ ¥ - - = p p p (29)
removes the inflation bias in steady state. Unfortunately, the inflation bias is path dependent because
debt is adjusted to supply shocks. It is widely acknowledged that it is practically impossible to
encode fully state-contingent rules into a monetary constitution. Thus the inflation target can only
remove the steady state component of the inflation bias, leaving the history-dependent component
entirely unaffected
16. By the same token it would be straightforward to show that the responses of
expenditures, taxes, inflation and debt to supply shocks are identical to the case of discretion,
eq.(11), (12), (15) and (16).
Consider instead what would happen if monetary policy were delegated to a weight-conservative
central bank
17, characterised by the following loss function:
( ) ( ) ( )
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In this case the closed-loop solution for inflation is:
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16 Svensson (1997) reaches the same conclusion assuming that output is autocorrelated.
17 Observe that (30) accounts for the case where expenditures do not enter the Bank’s objective function,  0 = a , and
even with the possibility that price stability is the only  objective for monetary policy,  ¥ ﬁ g16
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A simple example will show that weight conservatism may improve welfare. For instance, suppose






c B W W = . In this case the policy response to current debt levels coincides
with the precommitment solution. From this point of view weight-conservatism is unambiguously
preferred to an inflation-targeting regime. On the other hand, both regimes generate suboptimal
responses to supply shocks. In the appendix we show that the response of a goal independent central
bank is preferred for relatively low values of  b . This happens because the more the policymaker is
willing to use debt as a shock absorber the less monetary intervention is needed. It would be
straightforward to show that assigning a target to a weight-conservative central banker would always
improve welfare relative to the two alternatives discussed above.
Let us now turn to the analysis of a simple zero-inflation rule. Beetsma et al. (1996) have pointed out
that, absent supply shocks, a zero-inflation rule dominates discretion if k ˆ  is sufficiently small.
Extending their analysis to account for supply shocks, we are able to show that such rule may
generate second order losses if both k ˆ and the discount factor are sufficiently small. This requires
that seigniorage is a relatively unimportant source of revenues and that the government relies heavily
on debt policy as a buffer against supply shocks. The same argument obviously carries over to the
comparison with delegation schemes.17
4.Conclusions
This paper presents a model where governments are unable to eradicate inflationary pressures by
means of an appropriate debt policy. The choice of monetary regime has no impact on steady state
debt levels, which are crucially influenced by the government reluctance to engage in a policy of debt
reduction. On the other hand, in steady state public expenditures are constrained by the availability of
seigniorage revenues.
Turning to the analysis of policy regimes, we find that “pure” inflation targets are unable to remove
the path-dependent component of the inflation bias and generate monetary responses to shocks
which are too interventionist. Thus institutional design should contemplate the assignment of targets
to weight-conservative Central Banks. The government willingness to use debt policy as a buffer to
stabilise expenditures crucially affects the choice of central bank preferences: the latter should be
more conservative the more interventionist is debt policy.
These results suggest that worries about the “excessive” independence and conservatism of the
European Central Bank might be overstated if the “Stability and Growth Pact” will allow EMU
members to implement a countercyclical debt policy. Since seigniorage revenues in Europe have
become negligible long before the start of EMU, the argument obviously carries over to the case of
asymmetric disturbances. In fact our conclusions about the performance of a simple zero-inflation
rule suggest that the adverse effects caused by the renounce to a national monetary policy may be
relatively unimportant if policymakers are willing and able to use their fiscal instruments to stabilise
output and expenditures. Therefore EMU members should quickly correct their long-term fiscal
stances and bring structural deficits closer to balance. If this does not happen, the Stability Pact will
become a straightjacket on national fiscal policies and the potential gains from fiscal stabilisation will
remain out of reach.18
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Appendix
To determine the optimal monetary response to stochastic shifts in expenditures we proceed as
follows. Taking the expected value of the loss function (3):
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where we know from eq. (22) that the expected path of debt, i.e. the term  ( )
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To show that the monetary response to shocks implemented by a weight-conservative central banker
may be preferred to the corresponding monetary policy carried out under an inflation targeting
regime we proceed as follows.
Under discretion the expected loss amounts to
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18 These results obviously hold if ( ) 1 1 + > r b20
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If monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank, eq. (26), whose preferences are such




a , the policymaker’s expected loss function amounts to:
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It would be straightforward to show that the sign of the term in the first curly bracket is
unambiguously positive. On the other hand the sign of the term in the second curly bracket is
positive if
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Since the monetary response to shocks under inflation targeting corresponds to the case of
discretion, this implies that monetary policy delegation to weight-conservative central banker

















Turning to the case of a zero inflation rule
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The term in the first curly brackets is positive if  k ˆ is sufficiently small, as in Beetsma et al. (1997).
The term in the second curly brackets is positive if22
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